



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

North. In his most important military operations Gordon was handicapped by an incapable superior officer. Three great opportunities came to him and the same inefficient superior in each case prevented success: (1) On the first day at Gettysburg, Gordon was driving a broken enemy before him, yet was ordered by Early to halt, and the Federals then secured the heights. Gordon, however, is of the opinion that Lee would have won on both the second and third days had Longstreet obeyed orders. (2) At the Battle of the Wilderness on May 6, 1864, Early refused to accept Gordon's statement as to the disposition of the enemy in his front, restraining him from making a flank attack until General Lee interfered. (3) At Cedar Creek Gordon was again pursuing a fugitive army before him, when Early stopped the pursuit, thus enabling Sheridan to make his famous ride and completely rout Early, who then laid the blame on his soldiers, accusing them of straggling and looting in the Federal camp. This accusation is flatly denied by Gordon. Few other controversial questions are touched upon. He thinks that Bragg was not fitted to exercise command. In regard to the Davis-Johnston question, he believes that the similarity in character between the two men prevented them from working well together, Johnston not fully meeting his duty to the President, and the latter not sufficiently trusting Johnston. The greater part of the book is devoted, not to the rising, but to the falling fortunes of the Confederacy, the slow battering, and strangling and starving of the South. The "magnanimity of Appomattox" would have extended through reconstruction, Gordon believes, had the soldiers and not the politicians been in control of public policy. The "ineffable littleness" of President Johnston and the vindictiveness of Johnson, Stanton, and Halleck are contrasted with the conduct of the great soldiers on the Federal side.

WALTER L. FLEMING.

West Virginia University.

Parliamentary England. By EDWARD JENKS, M. A. Pp. xix, 441. Price \$1.35. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. The Story of the Nations Series, 1903.

"Parliamentary England" deals with the century and a half which elapses between the time of Cromwell and the Reform Bill of 1832. The author chooses for his subject the evolution of the Cabinet System. "It is the business of this book," he says, "to explain how that system of government which came into force in England with the Restoration of Charles II. in 1660 was changed, in the course of one hundred and seventy years, into the system which was in force at the passing of the Reform Bill, and which, with some modifications, is in force at the present day. In the first place, therefore, it is necessary to explain how England was governed in the years which follow the return of the Stuarts." With this brief introduction, he plunges into a discussion of the system maintained under the Restoration. But inasmuch as the volume is supposedly written for a popular circulation, and not primarily for students of constitutional history, this brief introduction to the subject seems inadequate. The average reader, with little or no knowledge of constitutional history, after reading the

final chapter on "History and Criticism," will feel that he ought to go back and re-read the book from the view-point of that chapter. This may be an excellent frame of mind into which to get the reader, but unfortunately, the majority will not find time for a second perusal of the work. A brief introductory pre-view indicating some of the "points of interest" to be looked for along the way, would have been invaluable to inexperienced readers.

Lack of space makes it impossible to follow the author as he threads his way through the politics of one hundred and fifty years. But his final chapter, in which he summarizes the causes which have produced, and the consequences which have flowed from, the Cabinet System calls for notice. The book is written in an interesting way, and brings out the leading points clearly. From it, as from a hill-top, any intelligent reader may look back and get a fair conception of the country through which he has passed. The author shows that the statesmen of the late seventeenth century were animated neither by an abstract passion for republicanism nor for social equality, but by a "conviction of the practical dangers of a *jure divino* monarchy." They met the loyal maxim,—the King can do no wrong (which they were not ready to set aside),—with its complement,—"royal commands are no excuse for wrong doing." Thus ministers who leaned on the reed-like favor of the King, were made to feel their responsibility. But Charles II.—the *roi faineant*—gave an opportunity to men of ambition, and they were not long in finding a more solid bulwark than royal favor in *political connection*. With this as a shield, they plunged once more into the race for power. The reign of James II. and the Glorious Revolution strengthened this tendency, and thus the great Whig party, at first an organization for defence, became an active power in the conduct of affairs. The accession of the Hanoverians carried the process so far that England was in danger of falling under the control of a permanent bureaucracy. But the Cabinet, having established its power against the crown, finds it has to face the criticism of Parliament. A law which prevented the creation of new offices for the benefit of members of the House of Commons widened the breach between Cabinet and Commons, and led Walpole to use an organized system of bribery to beat down opposition. The reappearance of the Tory party in Parliament, at first unfavorable to the new system, soon added to it the final principle, viz., "that the supreme arbitrament of politics belongs, neither to the Crown, nor to the Cabinet, nor to Parliament, but to the constituencies."

In conclusion the author calls attention to the "extraordinary, unconscious character of the whole process which has resulted in the establishment of the system. Each step has been the consequence, not of any matured scheme for the reform of the Constitution, but of the practical exigencies of a particular situation." Out of this process has grown something which is rather "a means of disguising the machinery of government, than the machinery of government itself. It is politics in solution."

CHARLES T. WYCKOFF.

Bradley Polytechnic Institute.